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ABSTRACT
This paper presents yet another attempt towards robust and
secure watermarking. Some recent works have looked at
this issue first designing new watermarking schemes with a
security oriented point of view, and then evaluating their
robustness compared to state-of-the-art but unsecure tech-
niques. Our approach is, on contrary, to start from a very
robust watermarking technique and to propose changes in
order to strengthen its security levels. These changes in-
clude the introduction of a security criterion, an embedding
process implemented as a maximization of a robustness met-
ric under the perceptual and the security constraints, and a
watermarking detection seen as a contrario decision test.
Our experimentations lead to, once again, a trade-off be-
tween security and robustness. The technique is now per-
fectly secure against attacks mounted during the second edi-
tion of the BOWS challenge, but the price to pay is either a
lower robustness against common image processing, either a
bigger probability of false alarm.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.4.9 [Computing Methodologies]: Image processing and
computer vision, Applications
General Terms
Design, Experimentation
Keywords
Watermarking, robustness, security, attacks, optimization
under constraints.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security of digital watermarking is now widely considered
as very different from robustness since [1] and [4]. This
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last reference provides a framework for assessing the secu-
rity levels of a watermarking technique, and it has been used
to analyze some very popular schemes, for instance quanti-
zation index modulation in [13] or dirty paper trellis in [2].
These analyses revealed the relatively weak security levels
of state-of-the-art robust techniques.
More recently, this subject turned into a more fundamen-
tal question: is it possible to create a watermarking tech-
nique which is both robust and secure? Some articles de-
signed schemes with security as a top priority, then evalu-
ated the robustness [10, 11]. The gap is quite big compared
to past robust techniques. But even if there is no fundamen-
tal proof (as far as we know), a trade-off between robustness
and security seems to exist in real-life watermarking tech-
niques.
Here our approach is the reverse, as we start with a very
robust zero-bit watermarking technique1, Broken Arrows,
and try to increase its security levels. Broken Arrows has
been designed for the second contest of Break Our Water-
marking System (BOWS-2) [9]. The embedding is based on
spread spectrum in the wavelet domain, but with side infor-
mation enforced through a maximization under an unique
constraint: the robustness, defined as the minimum noise
power to go outside the detection region, is maximized un-
der the perceptual constraint, which is here accounted by
an Euclidean distance. Exploiting the fact that the embed-
ding did not modify the signs of the wavelet coefficients, A.
Westfeld found the more powerful attack of the first episode
of the contest. This weakness has been patched in [5]: an
attack removing the watermark with probability 1/2 will
now degrade the image quality down to 26dB whereas the
embedding quality is set to 43dB.
This increases the robustness, but the security levels of
Broken Arrows were to be improved as well. The embed-
ding is considerably modifying the power distribution of the
signal in the secret subspace. With OPAST, an available im-
plementation of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
the authors of [3] succeeded to disclose the secret space of
the original version of Broken Arrows, pointing out a lack of
security. In a recent paper, we proposed a counter-measure
to this attack [15]. The distribution of the signal power
is much more uniform than before, and this is sufficient to
ruin the above mentioned attacks. However, this is not per-
fect. It might still be possible for the pirate to use more
powerful implementations of PCA than OPAST, and collect
1There is no capacity since this is zero-bit watermarking,
see [8].
Representatives Original Watermarked Watermark Dimension
subscript X Y W -
“image” in pixel space iX iY iW Wi ×Hi
“signal” in wavelet space sX sY sW Ns
“vector” in secret space vX vY vW Nv
Table 1: The table of terminology and notations.
much more watermarked images to take advantage of this
still slightly uneven power distribution.
In this paper, we strenghen this scheme against attacks
based on second order statistics such as PCA, by striking a
perfectly even distribution of the power. This security ori-
ented focus is implemented in practice by a maximization
under two constraints: the embedding aims at maximizing
robustness under a perceptual constraint and a security con-
straint. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
that watermarking security is enforced right into the embed-
ding algorithm.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce the motivations and relevant inspira-
tion to design this robust and secure watermarking scheme.
Section 3 describes the implementation of the proposed wa-
termarking algorithm. Section 4 depicts the watermark em-
bedding core process. Experimental results are illustrated
in Section 5, and the conclusion is given in Section 6. The
terminology and notations are summarized in Table 1.
2. A CONTRARIO DECISION
As far as we know, there is no known optimum zero-bit
watermarking technique for multimedia contents. This is
mostly due to the lack of stationarity and to the wide variety
of distribution from a content to another. From the theo-
retical viewpoint, [8] proposes a unifying theory of zero-bit
watermarking, but its main drawback is its lack of univer-
sality: the embedder and detector must know the statistical
distribution of the host content. More recently, Comesan˜a
et al. have found the optimum scheme under the restric-
tive assumption that the host distribution belongs to the
white and Gaussian family [6], whatever its variance. To
apply this theoretical result into a real application, Broken
Arrows [9] projects many wavelet coefficients sX ∈ RNs of
the image (with Ns > 200, 000) into a secret (i.e. pseudo-
randomly generated) subspace S = Span(SC) of very low
dimension (Nv = 256). This makes the projection vector
vX = S
T
CsX ∈ RNv almost white and Gaussian distributed.
At the end, we can write that vX ∼ N (0, σ2XINv ), where
σ2X = ||sX ||2, i.e. the variance varies from a content to an-
other. Several tweaks are also deployed to tackle a percep-
tual model and to improve the robustness against common
image processing (see [9]).
However, as already mentioned in the introduction, Bro-
ken Arrows is robust but not secure. The embedding pushes
the vector vX deep into the acceptance region which is an
hypercone, focusing most of the embedding energy along its
directions. This brings in an uneven distribution of the wa-
termarked signals power in the space, and a PCA algorithm
can disclose the directions of the hypercone.
We propose here a very different paradigm, inspired by
works in computer vision proposing a partial gestalt system
based on the Helmholtz principle [7]. This principle groups
a set of observed objects into one class if it is very unlikely
that randomness could have generated such configuration.
This is also known in statistics as a contrario detection. The
detection decides one of the two hypotheses H0 or H1 based
on some observations x. A statistical model is assumed un-
der H0 as a distribution pH0 , but there is no such model
for the alternative H1, because this hypothesis is far too
broad, and/or what happens under H1 is not well known.
Therefore, the Neyman-Pearson theorem doesn’t apply and
no maximum likelihood test is possible. Instead, the detec-
tor evaluates the probability to observe x under pH0 , and if
this event is unlikely, it decides for H1.
Here we exactly consider the same idea: for original nat-
ural images, we assume that the projection vector vR of
the received image is white Gaussian distributed: pH0 ∝
N (0, σ2INv ). Watermark detection is triggered on when
this vector is not typical from that distribution. There-
fore, embedding amounts to render vX as much as possi-
ble (i.e. while fulfilling the constraints of embedding dis-
tortion and security) not typical with regard to pH0 . This
method is different from usual approaches where embedding
transforms host vector vX ∼ pH0 into a watermarked vector
vY ∼ pH1 and where the detector measures the likelihood
ratio pH1(vR)/pH0(vR) (or its derivative for a LMP test) to
decide whether vR is watermarked or not.
3. THE EMBEDDING CORE PROCESS
We detail in this section how the concepts introduced in
the above sections are implemented. We assume here that
we have extracted a Gaussian distributed vector vX from
the host content, and that a targeted PSNR controls the
watermark embedding. This scheme applies to any spread
spectrum based watermarking on any type of content. The
next session gives details when the scheme is applied to a
particular still image watermarking for illustration purpose.
3.1 Three functions
As mentioned above, we have to manage three criteria
during the embedding: the perceptual quality of the water-
marked image, the global security of the scheme, and the
Gaussianity of the signals.
3.1.1 Quality
We assume the targeted PSNR imposes a constraint on the
Euclidean distance of the watermark signal vW = vY −vX ,
such that ‖vW ‖ < ρ. We will see later that parameter ρ
is not only a function of the targeted PSNR but also on
some statistic of the host image. For this reason, it might
vary from a content to another, even if the required PSNR
is fixed. We define the following function:
cQ(vW ) =
‖vW ‖ − ρ2
ρ2
. (1)
3.1.2 Security
As mentioned in the introduction, a counter-attack to the
OPAST threat (and any algorithm implementing a PCA) is
to make sure that, on average, the power of the watermarked
signal in the secret space S is equal to the one in the com-
plementary space S⊥: PY (S) = PY (S⊥). We assume that
for natural images, the power of the host signal is evenly
distributed: PX(S) = PX(S⊥). Since the embedding only
modifies the signal in S, we need to enforce a conservation
of the power in this subspace: PY (S) = PX(S).
This argument holds on average: PX(S) is the average
power present in S over a very large collection of natural
images. However, we have noticed that the energy of the
projection onto S, namely ‖vX‖, greatly varies from one
image to another, and it might be hazardous to bet on any
average value. Therefore, we enforce a stricter rule: ‖vY ‖ =
‖vX‖. If the energy is conserved for any host image, then it
must be true on average. We define the following function:
cS(vW ,vX) =
‖vX + vW ‖ − ‖vX‖
‖vX‖ . (2)
3.1.3 Gaussianity
There are plenty of tests to decide whether a collection
of i.i.d. data has been drawn from a given probability dis-
tribution. For continuous distributions and especially the
Gaussian distribution, the Anderson-Darling test is one of
the most famous. In brief, the test computes the statistic
Aˆ2 from the samples {v(i)}Nvi=1 as follows:
1. Mean µ and the standard deviation σ are estimated
from the samples.
2. Samples are normalized: vn(i) = (v(i)− µ)/σ.
3. Samples are then sorted in increasing order to get
(vs(1), . . . , vs(Nv)).
4. Compute Aˆ2 = (−Nv − T )(1 + 4N − 25N2 ).
5. If Aˆ2 > α, then the samples are not Gaussian dis-
tributed.
with
T = N−1v
Nv∑
i=1
[(2i− 1) lnΦ(vs(i))
+ (2(N − i) + 1) ln (1− Φ(vs(i)))].
The value of α depends on the level of the test (see [14,
Table 1, part (a), page 239]). For instance, if Aˆ2 > 1.029,
the data are deemed non Gaussian, and the probability of
being wrong is 0.01. We take Aˆ2 as the detection score
f(vR) for the vector vR extracted from the received image.
The image is declared as watermarked if f(vR) > α and
the probability of false alarm is indeed the level of the test
corresponding to this threshold.
3.2 Constrained optimization
We consider the watermark embedding as a maximiza-
tion under constraints. The embedding looks for the wa-
termark vector v⋆W which maximizes the objective function
f(vX + vW ) under the constraints that cQ(vW ) ≤ 0 and
cS(vW ,vX) = 0:
v⋆W = arg max
vW∈R
Nv :cQ(vW )≤0,cS(vW ,vX )=0
f(vX + vW ) (3)
3.2.1 Necessary conditions
So far, the constraints can be trivially fulfilled by setting
vW = 0. Therefore, we are sure to maximize an objective
function over a non empty set. However, since watermark-
ing is always a matter of trade-off between distortion and
robustness, we would like to consume all the allowed dis-
tortion to maximize our chance of being robust. In other
words, we would like to replace the inequality by the equal-
ity cQ(vW ) = 0. There is a necessary condition so that
both equality constraints can be satisfied. The constraint
on quality describes a hypersphere of radius ρ centered on
vX , whereas the constraint on security defines a hypersphere
of radius ‖vX‖ centered on 0. Both constraints can be ful-
filled if the intersection of those two regions is not empty.
This holds if the necessary condition is true:
ρ/2 ≤ ‖vX‖. (4)
The equality holds in this equation when the hyperspheres
are tangent in a point vW = −2vX so that vY = −vX .
Since vX is assumed to be Gaussian distributed, so is vY ,
and consequently an embedding restricted to consume all
the distortion budget fails in this case.
To avoid this situation, we need to properly design the
technique so that over a vast majority of images, Inequal-
ity (4) holds. However, it is clear that some pictures will not
be watermarked, such as a uniform image. This is indeed
quite sound. Watermarking content when the host power is
too weak raises a security flaw as the host is not properly hid-
ing the watermarking signal. Since vX(i) ∼ N (0,Σ2), with
Σ2 the average power of the wavelet coefficients (see [9, Sec.
3.3]), then E[‖vX‖2] = NvΣ2. This shows that the dimen-
sion reduction operated by the projection from RNs to RNv
must not be too strong. This is the reason why we increase
Nv from 256 (as set in the original Broken Arrows technique)
to 1024. There is clearly a trade-off with the complexity of
the embedder and detector.
For some rare images, this precaution is not enough and
(4) does not hold. We then reduce the embedding distortion
to 90% of the maximum 2‖vX‖ and we stay with an equality
quality constraint. Therefore, we hope that the maximiza-
tion is done over a large enough set, and with a large enough
embedding distortion budget in order to find a big and ro-
bust extremum of f .
3.2.2 Numerical algorithm
We use the Matlab implementation of the ‘Interior-Point
Algorithm’ to solve this maximization under constraints.
This program can tackle large scale problems and is robust,
as it can recover from ‘NaN’ or ‘Inf’ results. It also takes
benefit from ’user-supplied’ derivatives, and Hessian of the
objective and the constraints functions. An important point
is that these functions are not convex; therefore, there are
a priori local maxima. When starting from different initial
points, the algorithm might end at different local maxima.
Here is a way to find a suitable initial point:
1. Define the constants
α = 1− ρ
2
2‖vX‖2 , β = ‖vX‖
√
(1− α2)
2. Randomly draw a vector n ∈ RNv .
3. Compute n′ = n− nT vX
‖vX‖
2 vX
4. Set v
(0)
W = (α− 1)vX + β n
′
‖n′‖
.
It is easy to see that cQ(v
(0)
W ) = cS(v
(0)
W ,vX) = 0. Since
the creation of such an initial vector is not a computational
burden, we generate plenty of them, we compute their scores
with the function f , and we give Matlab the one with the
biggest score as an initial vector.
4. PLUGGING BROKEN ARROWS
This section focuses on the embedding process and how
the above algorithm is plugged into Broken Arrows still im-
age watermarking technique. The discrete wavelet transform
of the original image is computed. Some wavelet coefficients
are stored in a vector sX . Its projection onto the secret sub-
space is vX = S
T
CsX . This matrix is composed of Nv binary
carriers of {+1,−1}Ns , normalized by a factor of 1/√Ns.
From the input vX , the above algorithm outputs a water-
mark vector vW of norm ρ, which is mapped back into the
wavelet domain by sW = SCvW . The norm of sW equals
vTWS
T
CSCvW . If SC was orthonormal, then we would have
‖sW ‖ = ρ. Yet, this is not the case. We prefer to have a
very fast generator of SC (pseudo-random binary generator)
than a true orthonormal matrix. However, since it is a very
long random matrix, we assume that it is almost the case:
‖sW ‖ ≈ ‖vW ‖ = ρ. (5)
4.1 Impacts of the perceptual mask
The watermark signal is added to sX with some perceptual
mask m:
sY (i) = sX(i) +m(i).sW (i). (6)
In the original technique, the mask was ‘proportional’ in
the sense that m(i) = |sX(i)|. However, a security flaw
stemmed from this mask, and we use the more secure AWC
mask proposed in [5].
The mask has two important impacts we will take into
account in the following subsections.
4.1.1 Effect on the embedding distortion
Wemodel the masking weights by random variables statis-
tically independent of sW , and with second order moment
empirically measured as M2 = N−1s
∑Ns
i=1 m(i)
2. This as-
sumption allows us to write that ‖sY −sX‖2 ≈M2.‖sW ‖2 ≈
M2ρ2. This squared norm is also equal to the Mean Squared
Error over the image, times the number of pixels (because
the wavelet transform conserves the Euclidean norm). Hence
the following relationship between ρ and the required PSNR:
ρ ≈ 255.
√
WiHi√
M2
10−PSNR/20, (7)
where (Wi, Hi) is the width and height of the original image.
4.1.2 Effect on the projection vector
A difficulty stems from the fact that the mask disturbs
the retro-projection. When we mix the generated water-
mark signal sW in the wavelet space, and then retro-project
the watermarked signal sY back onto the secret space, it is
not located where we expect, that is, not in vY = vX +vW .
Actually, the retro-projection denoted by v
(1)
Y works as fol-
lows:
v
(1)
Y (k) = vX(k) +
Nv∑
j=1
vW (j)
Ns∑
i=1
m(i)sC,j(i)sC,k(i). (8)
We need to assume that i) the involved variables can be
treated as independent r.v., ii) the second sum over Ns co-
efficients can be seen as the empirical average equaling the
expectation, iii) STCSC ≈ INv , to derive this simplification:
v
(1)
Y (k) ≈ vX(k) + vW (k)M (9)
with M = N−1s
∑Ns
i=1 m(i). Therefore, from a vector vW of
norm ρ created at the embedding side, we end up with a
vector v
(1)
W = v
(1)
Y − vX ≈MvW , at the detection side.
We must take this ‘amplification’ into account when look-
ing for the best watermark vector. For this, we modify ρ by
a factor M , and the maximization under constraint yields a
vector vW that we scale by a factor 1/M , before embedding
in signal:
ρ =
255.M
√
WiHi√
M2
10−PSNR/20 (10)
sY (k) = sX(k) +m(k).sW (k)/M. (11)
In this way, we are sure to maximize the score at the detec-
tion side, while yielding the required PSNR at the embed-
ding side.
4.2 Improving the accuracy
A big difference with Broken Arrow is that the score is cal-
culated from a vector of big dimension Nv (f : R
Nv → R),
whereas in Broken Arrows this vector was projected again
on a 2D space before the score was computed (R2 → R+).
Figure 8 in [9] shows that there is some inaccuracy in the
embedding: in this 2D space, the embedding targets a given
location, and at the detection side, the watermarked image
is projected on a different position nearby. This inaccuracy
is due to the approximations we made so far, and we noticed
that its impact is even bigger with our proposed scheme, cer-
tainly because the score is now computed on a much higher
dimension space. We propose here to reduce this inaccuracy.
4.2.1 Orthonormal Matrix
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, Relation (9) is obtained
thanks to the three listed assumptions, and it is quite easy
to get rid off the last one. As already mentioned, the gen-
eration of the secret matrix SC is very fast, but this matrix
is not exactly orthonormal. STCSC is positive definite, and
is thus diagonalizable as VTΛV with VTV = VVT = INv
and Λ a diagonal matrix. Let us denote by C the square root
of the inverse matrix: C = VTΛ−1/2V. For a given secret
key, we compute in advance this Nv × Nv matrix. Finally,
we modify the projection steps as follows:
v = CSTCs, (12)
s = SCCv. (13)
This renders our scheme more accurate for two reasons:
• Now we have exactly ‖sW ‖2 = vTWCTSTCSCCvW =
vTWΛ
−1/2ΛΛ−1/2vW = ‖vW ‖2 instead of the Approx-
imation (5).
• If Assumptions i) and ii) of 4.1.2 hold, then at the
detection side we would get vY = vX +MvW .
The storage of the pre-computed matrix C however needs
4 MB for Nv = 1024.
(2)
Y
v
(0)
Y
v
(0)
W
M
v
(1)
W
v
(0)
W
v
(2)
W
v
(1)
Y
v
X
v
Figure 1: The iterative projection scheme
4.2.2 Iterative embedding
The remaining assumptions i) and ii) of 4.1.2 do not ex-
actly hold in practice, and even with (10) and (11), we get
v
(1)
Y = vY + ǫ with ‖ǫ‖ ≪ ‖vY ‖. We propose the follow-
ing iterative embedding sketched in Figure 1 to combat this
effect.
• Initialization: Once the wavelet transform completed
and the extracted coefficients stored in sX , compute
vX by (12) and ρ by (10). Denote v
(0)
W the result
of the maximization under constraints (3) and v
(0)
Y =
vX+v
(0)
W . Compute s
(0)
W (13) and embed it in the host
signal (6) to get s
(1)
Y .
• Iteration K: From s(K)Y , project back onto the se-
cret space (12). This gives v
(K)
Y . Compute v
(K)
W =
v
(K−1)
W +(v
(K)
Y −v(0)Y ). Compute s(K)W (13) and embed
it the host signal (6) to get s
(K+1)
Y .
• Stop: We stop iterating when we are close to the de-
sired point v
(0)
Y , i.e. ‖v(K)Y − v(0)Y ‖ < η. The wa-
termarked coefficients are copied back in the wavelet
domain and the inverse wavelet transform gives the
watermarked image iY .
This iterative process does take time but, in practice, just
one iteration is enough, as it already greatly reduces the
inaccuracy of the embedding.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The perceptual distortion and the security performance
of the proposed watermarking system are ensured in the
watermark signal generation as we have shown above. So,
in this section, we just assess the robustness of the proposed
watermarking scheme. First of all, we give the experimental
setup.
5.1 Setup
We test 2000 luminance images of size 512 × 512. These
pictures represent natural and urban landscapes, people, or
objects, taken with many different cameras from 2 to 5 mil-
lions of pixels. A three-level wavelet decomposition is per-
formed for each image, using a Daubechies 9/7 biorthog-
onal wavelet. Then, the selected wavelet coefficients are
projected to the secret matrix, which is generated by the
Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator seeded
by a secret key. The dimension of the secret space is Nv =
1024. The embedding distortion is set by a targeted PSNR
of 43dB (except in Section 5.2). The number of the tested
starting vectors is set to 100. The critical value α is set
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Figure 2: The good detection probability with the
Gaussian noise attack.
to 1.029 for a 1% level. The options of the Matlab In-
terior Point algorithm are set as follows: TolFun=10−6,
TolCon=10−6, MaxIter=120, gradConstr = ‘on’, gradObj
= ‘on’, DerivativeCheck = ‘off’, FunValCheck = ‘on’, Hes-
sian = ‘user-supplied’.
5.2 Noise attacks
To evaluate the robustness against attack noise, we add
the noise directly to the watermarked vector vY :
v′Y = vY + σNn (14)
where n is drawn from a normal distribution, and σN is the
power of the attack in relation with a PSNRa between the
attacked image and the watermarked image:
σN = 255
√
WiHi
Ns
.10−
PSNRa
20 . (15)
This artificial attack allows to benchmark the key ideas of
this paper: i) include the security criterion right into the
embedding process, ii) a contrario decision test, while de-
coupling it from this image processing implementation.
To get a better simulation, for each image, we test it with
30 different noise patterns, and compute the average accep-
tance rate. Figure 2 plots the good detection probability
against PSNRa in dB.
5.3 Common attacks
The benchmark of the real still image watermarking tech-
nique is the same as in [9]: the attacks are mainly composed
of combinations of JPEG and JPEG 2000 compressions at
different quality factors, low-pass filtering, wavelet subband
erasure, and a simple denoising algorithm. Figure 3 shows
the average PSNR of the attacked images and the average
probability of good detection for the 14 most efficient attacks
on the proposed watermarking technique. The result of the
benchmark is quite similar to the ones shown in [9, Fig-
ure 11] or [15, Figure 5]. However, this technique is much
weaker than the previous ones because the probability of
false alarm here is set to 1.10−2 whereas the previous levels
were at 3.10−6. This is the price to pay for a good security
level.
5.4 Collusion attacks
We speak of collusion attacks when several copies of the
same piece of content, watermarked with different secret
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Figure 3: Probability of good detection versus average PSNR of the attacked images for the proposed
watermark embedding techniques. Selection of attacks: 1) denoise threshold 20; 2) denoise threshold 30; 3)
JPEG Q = 20; 4) JPEG2000 r = 0.001; 5) JPEG2000 r = 0.003; 6) JPEG2000 r = 0.005; 7) scale 1/2; 8)
scale 1/3; 9) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 50; 10) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 60; 11) scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 70; 12)
scale 1/3 + JPEG Q = 90; 13) scale 1/4 + JPEG Q = 70; 14) scale 1/4 + JPEG Q = 80; 15) no attack.
keys are mixed to forge an illegal copy. This is the typi-
cal scenario of multimedia fingerprinting or traitor tracing.
As already discussed in a previous paper [16], a zero-bit wa-
termarking technique as Broken Arrows is a good candidate
as the embedding layer in such a scenario, different message
symbols being related to different keys. If we focus on binary
anti-collusion codes, as Tardos codes, one bit is embedded
in each block of the piece of content. So, each block i ex-
ists only in two versions: iY 1 and iY 2. We have tested the
following fusion processes at the mixing step of the attack:
1. Average: i′Y (i, j) = (iY 1(i, j) + iY 2(i, j))/2;
2. Interleaving: i′Y (i, j) ∈ {iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)} with prob-
ability Prob(i′Y (i, j) = iY 1(i, j)) = 1/2;
3. Maximum: i′Y (i, j) = max{iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)};
4. Minimum: i′Y (i, j) = min{iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)};
5. Uniform: i′Y (i, j) is a r.v. ∼ U([iY 1(i, j), iY 2(i, j)]).
Over a set of 2,000 images, Table 2 shows the estimated
probability Prob(K) of detecting K ∈ {0, 1, 2} watermarks
from the attacked images i′Y . The collusion succeeds in eras-
ing both watermarks only with a maximum rate not larger
than 3%. All attacks yield double detection with a big prob-
ability (more than 94%), which greatly improves the perfor-
mances of the tracing algorithm [12]. Note that the high
probability of false alarm is not a problem in this applica-
tion because we are only dealing with the attacked water-
marked images and because the anti-collusion fingerprinting
code can deal with a small amount of detection errors.
Attacks K = 0 K = 1 K = 2
Average 0.0195 0.0255 0.9550
Interleaving 0.0295 0.0275 0.9430
Maximum 0.0215 0.0270 0.9515
Minimum 0.0195 0.0300 0.9505
Uniform 0.0210 0.0285 0.9505
Table 2: The probabilities Prob(K) of detecting K
watermarks from the attacked images i′Y .
6. CONCLUSION
Despite the introduction of an arsenal of new ideas (max-
imization under a security constraint, a contrario decision
test ...), we face once again the same trade-off between se-
curity and robustness: To keep the same performances in
terms of good detection against common image processing,
we had to increase the probability of false alarm.
The proposed scheme is not perfectly secure. Taking into
account this particular security constraint in the embedding
guarantees that the scheme is only secure against second
order statistics analysis tools. However, some high order
statistics might leak information on the secret space. There-
fore, the issues now turn to be how many contents and com-
puting power a high order analysis requires to work accu-
rately. We believe that it is significantly more demanding,
we will try to quantify this gap in the future.
Despite its poor trade-off probability of false alarm vs. ro-
bustness, we believe that this scheme has some serious po-
tential in the images (or video) watermarking applications,
especially in multimedia fingerprinting (a.k.a. traitor trac-
ing), since the contents are all watermarked in this scenario
the probability of false alarm is no longer a problem. The
question is more about the symbols likely to be hidden in
the pirated copy. As far as we know, any watermark detec-
tor outputs binary decision about the presence or absence
of the watermarks (this includes potential multiple detec-
tions). The a contrario decision test can indeed provide a
probability of the presence of a given symbol; ie. a soft
output bringing more information for the Tardos accusation
step. This idea is also the subject of our next work.
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